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Abstract Securing diﬀerent online e-business activities usually requires ap-
plying diﬀerent cryptographic algorithms. The proxy signcryption algorithms
are designed for applications such as online proxy auction or online proxy
signatures on business contracts, which require a proxy agent to sign on con-
ﬁdential messages. This paper proposes a proxy credential forgery attack to
two recent proxy signcryption schemes in the literature. Using the attack, a
malicious proxy signer can create a fake proxy credential from his original cre-
dential to extend his signing power. Simple modiﬁcations to these two schemes
are also provided in this paper to prevent the attack without adding too much
computational complexity. In addition to the contribution of introducing a new
type of attacks to signcryption schemes, the paper also points out that, while
designing a secure proxy signcryption scheme, not only the unforgeability of
proxy signatures is important, the unforgeability of proxy credentials should
be equally important as well.
Keywords Proxy signcryption · Proxy credential forgery attack · Bilinear
pairings
1 Introduction
The notion of proxy signature was introduced by Mambo et al. in 1996 [1]. It
allows a proxy signer to sign a message on behalf of an original signer, where
the proxy signature can be publicly veriﬁed. Following Mambo’s paper, quite
a few proxy signature schemes were proposed such as those in [2–10].
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However, for e-business applications such as online proxy auction or busi-
ness contract signing by an authorized proxy, it might be necessary to have
proxy signatures on conﬁdential messages. In 1997, Zheng [11] proposed a sign-
cryption (signature and encryption) scheme which only allows a designated
recipient to verify the signature to protect message conﬁdentiality. Following
Zheng’s paper, some other signcryption schemes [12–17] were also proposed
in literature. In these proxy signcryption schemes, the original signer creates
a cryptographically protected proxy credential and gives it to a proxy signer.
Based on the proxy credential, the proxy signer can sign and encrypt a mes-
sage on behalf of the original signer and then send it to the signature veriﬁer.
During or after a signing process, a conﬂict (either the original signer denies
his proxy delegation, or a proxy signer denies his proxy signature) may occur.
If the honest party in a conﬂict is able to provide veriﬁable evidences, the
proxy signcryption scheme is non-repudiated. To resolve a conﬂict, it needs
a trusted judge to verify the provided evidences. Section 2.2 describes these
possible conﬂicts, the veriﬁable evidences and conﬂict resolving procedures.
In this paper, we proposed a Proxy Credential Forgery (PCF) attack to
two proxy signcryption schemes, which are the LWHY scheme (proposed by
Lin, Wu, Huang and Yeh in 2010) [16] and the EA scheme (proposed by
Elkamchouchi and Aboueleoud in 2007) [17]. Using the PCF attack, these two
schemes can be compromised and fail to preserve the non-repudiation property.
That is, a malicious proxy signer is able to create a fake proxy credential to
enlarge/extend his signing power in these two schemes and the fake proxy
credential can pass the veriﬁcation checks. The proposed PCF attack is general
and can be used to attack either proxy signature or signcryption schemes if
the schemes have similar proxy credential generation algorithms as LWHY’s
and EA’s. At the end of the paper, some simple modiﬁcations to these two
schemes are provided to avoid such attack.
The organization of the paper is as follows. Section 2 discusses the proxy
signcryption security model and deﬁnes the proxy credential forgery attack.
Section 3 gives the mathematical background of the bilinear pairing, which is
the underlying cryptosystem used to build the LWHY and the EA proxy sign-
cryption schemes. Section 4 brieﬂy describes the LWHY scheme and proposes
how to attack the scheme by forging the proxy credential. Similarly in Section
5, the EA scheme is described and then the proxy credential forgery attack
to the scheme is presented. Sections 6 proposes the improvement to both the
LWHY and the EA schemes so that the modiﬁed schemes are secure against
the attack. Section 7 concludes the paper.
2 Proxy signcryption security model
To secure applications such as online proxy auction or business contract signing
by an authorized proxy, it requires using an proxy signcryption scheme to
ensure some security goals. Before itemizing these security requirements, this
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section will ﬁrst describe the proxy signcryption processing model such as who
are the involved parties and what are their roles in the process.
2.1 Proxy signcryption process and involved parties
In an proxy signcryption application, usually it will have four parties involved.
The original signer Uo delegates his signing power to a proxy signer Up to sign
and encrypt a message to a designated signature veriﬁer Uv. If there is a
conﬂict occurred, a trusted judge Uj will resolve the conﬂict by verifying the
evidences presented by the conﬂicting parties.
In general, there are ﬁve phases for a proxy signcryption scheme. They are
– Setup: A key generation center (KGC) chooses a cryptosystem, picks some
system parameters param and then make these parameters public. In some
schemes, the KGC generates the public-private key pairs for all partici-
pants, whereas in other schemes, each participant chooses his own public-
private key pair based on the public param.
– Proxy credential generation (PCG): In this phase, the original signer
Uo is responsible to generate the proxy credential. The PCG algorithm
takes as input of the private key of Uo and outputs a proxy credential to
the proxy signer Up.
– Proxy credential verification (PCV): Upon receiving the proxy cre-
dential, the proxy signer Up should verify the validity of the credential. The
PCV algorithm takes as input of the credential and the original signer’s
public key and then outputs a boolean value indicating either “pass” or
“fail”.
– Signcrypted message generation (SMG): With a valid proxy creden-
tial, the proxy signer Up is capable of signcrypting a message m to the
designated signature veriﬁer Uv. The SMG algorithm takes as input of the
plaintext m, the proxy credential, the private key of Up and the public key
of Uv. It outputs a signcrypted message δ.
– Signature recovery and verification (SRV):After receiving the sign-
crypted message δ, the signature veriﬁer Uv should recover the message and
signature and then verify the validity of the signature. The SRV algorithm
takes as input the signcrypted message δ, the private key of Uv and the
public keys of Uo and Up. It outputs a plaintext m and accepts a recovered
proxy signature if δ is valid. Otherwise, an error is reported.
2.2 Security requirement
A proxy signcryption scheme must satisfy two non-repudiation security re-
quirement.
– Proxy credential non-repudiation: If an original signer Uo did cre-
ate and give a proxy credential to a proxy signer Up, Uo cannot deny his
delegation later. To achieve this requirement, the scheme must
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1. provide a correct PCV algorithm that the validity of the credential can
be publicly checked, given the credential and Uo’s public key as input.
2. ensure the proxy credential unforgeability (PCNF) property. To
be more speciﬁc, the scheme needs to ensure that nobody, except the
original signer Uo or the KGC, is able to generate a valid proxy creden-
tial. That is, adversaries cannot generate a fake credential and pass the
PCV test.
In case an original signer Uo later denies a proxy credential held by a proxy
signer Up, the resolving procedure is as follows:
1. The trusted judge Uj asks Up to present the proxy credential.
2. If the provided credential passes the PCV test, the judge identiﬁes
the dishonesty of Uo on denying his own delegation. Otherwise, Up is
considered dishonest on using a false credential.
– Signcrypted message non-repudiation: If a proxy signer did signcrypt
a message to a signature veriﬁer Uv, Up cannot deny his signature later.
Again, to achieve this non-repudiation property, it requires the scheme to
1. provide a correct SMG algorithm that securely encrypts both the proxy
signature and message.
2. provide a correct SRV algorithm that is able to recover and verify the
validity of both the proxy signature and message.
3. ensure the signcrypted messages unforgeability (SMNF) property.
Or in other words, the scheme needs to ensure that nobody but the
proxy signer Up is able to generate the signcrypted message and pass
the SRV test.
If a proxy signer Up later denies a proxy signature held by a designated
recipient Uv, the resolving procedure is as follows:
1. The trusted judge Uj asks Uv to present the recovered message and
proxy signature from the signcrypted message.
2. With provided evidences, the judge can then use the SRV algorithm
to check the validity of the signature. If the checking succeeds, Up is
dishonest on denying his own signature. Otherwise, the signature pre-
sented by Uv is invalid.
2.3 Adversary types
Based on diﬀerent knowledge, there are four types of adversaries. For each
type of adversary, we give some possible malicious actions from the adversary
if the underlying proxy signcryption scheme is not properly designed to prevent
them.
– Type I adversary: An original signer Uo knows his own public and pri-
vate keys plus the public keys of Up and Uv. A malicious Uo may issue
a proxy credential to a Up and later deny it, or he may proxy signcrypt
a message and fool a signature veriﬁer Uv to believe that the signcrypted
message is from a proxy signer Up.
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– Type II adversary: A proxy signer Up knows his own public and private
keys plus the public keys of Uo and Uv. A malicious Up may signcrypt a
message to a signature veriﬁer Uv and later deny it, or he may create a
fake proxy credential so that he can proxy signcrypt a message without a
proper delegation from the original signer Uo. The second malicious action
from Up is the proxy credential forgery (PCF) attack we proposed in this
paper against the LWHY and the EA proxy signcryption schemes.
– Type III adversary: A signature veriﬁer Uv knows his own public and
private keys plus the public keys of Uo and Up. A malicious Uv may try
to generate a fake proxy signcrypted message to himself, fooling people to
believe the message is from a proxy signer Up.
– Type IV adversary: An outsider only knows the public keys of Uo, Up
and Uv. This type of adversary has the least power since he doesn’t know
the private key of anyone. Malicious actions may include identity-spooﬁng
himself as an original signer Uo or a proxy signer Up to generate a fake
proxy credential or a fake signcrypted message, respectively. He may be
also interested in cryptanalysis of a signcrypted message to recover the
message.
2.4 Proxy credential forgery attack
The proposed proxy credential forgery attack in this paper is a type II attack,
i.e., an attack from a malicious proxy signer Up. Before providing examples of
the attack in Sections 4 and 5, let’s deﬁne the attack ﬁrst.
Deﬁnition: The Proxy Credential Forgery (PCF) attack is an attack from a
proxy signer, with the knowledge of an existing proxy credential, public param-
eters of the the underlying cryptosystem and the public keys of all involved
parties, who can maliciously create a fake proxy credential to pass the PCV
test.
3 Cryptographic background - bilinear pairings
Bilinear pairing is a popular cryptosystem used recently in some eﬃcient en-
cryption or signature/signcryption schemes [16–22]. We will brieﬂy describe
the bilinear pairings in this section.
Let (G1,+) and (G2,×) be two cyclic groups of the same prime order q, B
be the generator of the additive group G1, and e : G1×G1 → G2 be a bilinear
map if it has the following properties:
(1) Bilinearity: ∀D,E, F ∈ G1, ∀a, b ∈ Z∗q , it satisﬁes that
e(D,E) = e(E,D) (1)
e(aD, bE) = e(D,E)ab = e(bD, aE) (2)
e(D,E + F ) = e(D,E)e(D,F ) (3)
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(2) Non-degeneracy: If B is a generator of G1, then e(B,B) is a generator of
G2.
(3) Computability: ∀D,E ∈ G1, there exists a polynomial-time algorithm to
eﬃciently compute e(D,E).
In general, most cryptographic schemes based on bilinear maps rely on the
bilinear variants of Diﬃe-Hellman hard problems as follows.
1. Computational Bilinear Diﬃe-Hellman Problem (CBDHP): GivenD, aD, bD
for a, b ∈ Z∗q , to compute abD.
2. Decision Bilinear Diﬃe-Hellman Problem (DBDHP): Given D, aD, bD, cD
for a, b, c ∈ Z∗q , and an element h ∈ G2, to decide h ?= e(D,D)abc.
Currently no known algorithm is available to solve them eﬃciently.
4 LWHY scheme and the PCF attack
This section gives a brief review of the LWHY scheme and then describes the
proxy credential forgery attack to the scheme.
The LWHY scheme has ﬁve phases: setup, proxy credential generation,
proxy credential veriﬁcation, signcrypted message generation, and signature
recovery and veriﬁcation. If a signer, either Uo or Up, later denies a signature,
a trusted judge will be asked to identify the dishonest party.
4.1 Setup
Given a security parameter k, a trusted key generation center KGC selects two
cyclic groups (G1,+) and (G2,×) of the same prime order q where |q| = 2k.
Let B be a generator of order q over G1 and e : G1 ×G1 → G2 be a bilinear
map. The KGC also chooses three collision-free hash functions
h1 : {0, 1}k ×G1 → Zq
h2 : G1 → G1
h3 : G2 ×G1 → {0, 1}k
Finally, the KGC publishes {G1, G2, q, B, e, h1, h2, h3}. Each user Ui chooses
a private key xi ∈ Zq and a public key
Yi = xiB (4)
4.2 Proxy credential generation
Uo delegates his signing power to Up, specifying the detail of the delegation in
a warrant mw. For example, it may include the identities of Uo, Up and Uv,
as well as the expiration date of this delegation. Uo chooses a secret random
number d ∈ Zq and then computes
N = dB (5)
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σ = xo + dmw mod q (6)
The proxy credential C = (σ,N,mw) will be sent to Up.
4.3 Proxy credential veriﬁcation
Upon receiving the proxy credential C from Uo, the proxy signer Up veriﬁes
its validity by performing the following PCV test.
σB
?= Yo + mwN (7)
According to LWHY’s paper, they claimed the credential is valid if Eq. (7)
holds since
σB = (xo + dmw)B - by Eq. (6)
= xoB + dBmw
= Yo + mwN - by Eq. (4), (5)
4.4 Signcrypted message generation
After the proxy credential is veriﬁed, Up signcrypts a message m on behalf of
Uo. Up chooses a secret random number r ∈ Zq and computes
R = rB (8)
S = r(h1(m,R) + xp + σ)−1B (9)
Φ = e(h2(σYv), xpYv) (10)
Ψ = Ev(S) (11)
Ω = h3(Φ,R)⊕m (12)
where Ev() denotes a symmetric encryption function with a share secret key
v between Up and Uv. Then Up delivers the signcrypted message δ = (R, Ψ,
Ω, N, mw) to the recipient Uv.
4.5 Signature recovery and veriﬁcation
Uv receives the signcrypted message δ from Up. Uv ﬁrst computes
Φ = e(h2(xv(Yo + mwN)), xvYp) (13)
since
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e(h2(xv(Yo + mwN)), xvYp)
=e(h2(xv(σB)), xvxpB) - by Eq. (7), (4)
=e(h2(σYv), xpYv) - by Eq. (4)
=Φ - by Eq. (10)
Thus, the computation of Eq. (13) can recover the original Φ generated from
Eq. (10) by Up. With Φ, Uv can recover the message m since
m = h3(Φ,R)⊕Ω (14)
Uv then recovers S from the received Ψ by
S = Dv(Ψ) (15)
where Dv() is the symmetric decryption function with the key v. Finally Uv
veriﬁes the proxy signature by performing the following SRV test.
e(h1(m,R)B + Yp + Yo + mwN,S)
?= e(B,R) (16)
Since
e(h1(m,R)B + Yp + Yo + mwN,S)
=e( h1(m,R)B + Yp + Yo + mwN,
r(h1(m,R) + xp + σ)−1B) - by Eq. (9)
=e( h1(m,R)B + xpB + xoB + dBmw, - by Eq. (4), (5)
r(h1(m,R) + xp + xo + dmw)−1B) - by Eq. (6)
=e( (h1(m,R) + xp + xo + dmw)B,
r(h1(m,R) + xp + xo + dmw)−1B)
=e(B, rB) - by Eq. (2)
=e(B,R) - by Eq. (8)
4.6 The PCF attack to the LWHY scheme
This section describes a proxy credential forgery attack to the LWHY scheme.
Without proper delegation from the original signer Uo, a malicious proxy signer
Up can unlawfully sign a message on behalf of Uo without being detected by the
designed recipient Uv. Furthermore, if Uo discovers the unlawful proxy signa-
ture later, he hands over the case to a trusted judge. Using the non-repudiation
tests in the LWHY scheme, the judge cannot identify the dishonesty of Up.
4.6.1 Up generates a fake proxy credential
A malicious Up can increase his signing power without a proper delegation
from Uo, such as extending the expiration date of the warrant or adding addi-
tional signature recipients into the warrant, by forging a fake proxy credential
(σ′, N ′,m′w) from the original (σ,N,mw) that he received from Uo before. Up
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chooses a fake proxy warrant m′w (with the extended signing power) and then
computes the corresponding σ′ and N ′ as follows:
σ′ =
m′w
mw
σ =
m′w
mw
xo + dm′w mod q (17)
N ′ =
m′w
mw
Yo + m′wN − Yo
m′w
(18)
Now, Up picks a random number r′ ∈ Zq and uses the fake σ′ to compute
R′, S′, Φ′, Ψ ′, Ω′ as Eq. (8) to Eq. (12). That is,
R′ = r′B (19)
S′ = r′(h1(m,R′) + xp + σ′)−1B (20)
Φ′ = e(h2(σ′Yv), xpYv) (21)
Ψ ′ = Ev(S′) (22)
Ω′ = h3(Φ′, R′)⊕m (23)
and sends the signcrypted message δ′ = (R′, Ψ ′, Ω′, N ′,m′w) to Uv.
4.6.2 Pass signature recovery and veriﬁcation
Upon receiving the fake signcrypted message, Uv performs the procedure as
described from Eq. (13) to Eq. (16) and will not detect the forgery of the
signcrypted message. Uv computes
Φ = e(h2(xv(Yo + m′wN
′)), xvYp) - by Eq. (13)
= e(h2(xvxoB + xvm′w ·
m′w
mw
Yo+m
′
wN−Yo
m′w
), xvxpB) - by Eq. (4), (18)
= e(h2(xvxoB + xvB(
m′w
mw
xo + dm′w − xo)), xvxpB) - by Eq. (4), (5)
= e(h2((xo +
m′w
mw
xo + dm′w − xo)Yv), xpYv) - by Eq. (4)
= e(h2(σ′Yv), xpYv) - by Eq. (17)
= Φ′ - by Eq. (21)
Uv then recovers m and S′ by computing m = h3(Φ′, R′)⊕Ω′ and S′ = Dv(Ψ ′).
Finally Uv performs the proxy signature veriﬁcation process in Eq. (16), but
the attack can pass the veriﬁcation without being detected since
e(h1(m,R′)B + Yp + Yo + m′wN
′, S′)
=e( h1(m,R′)B + Yp + Yo +
m′w
mw
Yo + m′wN − Yo, - by Eq. (18)
r′(h1(m,R′) + xp + σ′)−1B) - by Eq. (20)
=e( (h1(m,R′) + xp + xo +
m′w
mw
xo + dm′w − xo)B, - by Eq. (4), (5)
r′(h1(m,R′) + xp + σ′)−1B)
=e( (h1(m,R′) + xp + σ′)B, - by Eq. (17)
r′(h1(m,R′) + xp + σ′)−1B)
=e(B, r′B) - by Eq. (2)
=e(B,R′) - by Eq. (19)
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4.6.3 Failure of resolving repudiation
The original signer Uo later ﬁnds out the signature from the proxy signer Up
is not delegated by him and asks a trusted judge to resolve the conﬂict. The
judge ﬁrst asks Uv to present the converted proxy signature (S′, R′, N ′) and
(m,m′w), and then performs the SRV test in Eq. (16). As described in the
previous section, the veriﬁcation will succeed and the judge realizes that the
proxy signature was indeed signed by Up.
Next, the judge will ask Up to present the proxy credential he received from
Uo. The malicious Up can simply present the forged credential (σ′, N ′,m′w) to
the judge. The forged credential can falsely fool the judge to believe Up is
innocent since the checking of the PCV test in Eq. (7) will succeed as follows:
σ′B = (m
′
w
mw
xo + dm′w)B - by Eq. (17)
= m
′
w
mw
Yo + m′wN - by Eq. (4), (5)
= Yo +
m′w
mw
Yo + m′wN − Yo
= Yo + m′w(
m′w
mw
Yo+m
′
wN−Yo
m′w
)
= Yo + m′wN
′ - by Eq. (18)
5 EA scheme and the PCF attack
The EA scheme is a proxy identity-based signcryption scheme. It also has the
same ﬁve phases as the LWHY scheme.
5.1 Setup
Given security parameters k and n, the key generation center KGC chooses
two cyclic groups (G1,+) and (G2,×) of prime order q, a bilinear map e :
G1×G1 → G2, a generator B of G1, a master secret s ∈ Z∗q , a secure symmetric
encryption algorithm (E,D) such as AES, a system public key
Ypub = sB ∈ G1 (24)
and collision-free hash functions
h1 : {0, 1}∗ → G1
h2 : G2 → {0, 1}n
h3 : {0, 1}∗ ×G2 → Zq
The KGC publishes {G1, G2, q, B, Ypub, e, h1, h2, h3}. The KGC also assigns
each user Ui, with identity IDi, a public-private key pair (Yi, Xi) by computing
Yi = h1(IDi) (25)
Xi = sYi (26)
where both Yi and Xi ∈ G1. The key pair will be sent to the user in a secure
channel.
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5.2 Proxy credential generation
Uo generates a proxy credential to delegate his signing power. Uo ﬁrst chooses
a secret random number d ∈ Zq and compute
N = dB (27)
σ = Xo + dYpub (28)
The proxy credential C = (σ,N) is then sent to Up.
5.3 Proxy credential veriﬁcation
Up veriﬁes the validity of the received credential by performing the following
PCV test.
e(B, σ) ?= e(Ypub, Yo + N) (29)
since
e(B, σ) = e(B,Xo + dYpub) - by Eq. (28)
= e(B, sYo + dsB) - by Eq. (26), (24)
= e(sB, Yo + dB) - by Eq. (2)
= e(Ypub, Yo + N) - by Eq. (24), (27)
5.4 Signcrypted message generation
With a valid proxy credential, Up is able to signcrypt a message m to Uv on
behalf of Uo. Up chooses a random number r ∈ Z∗q and computes
k1 = e(B, Ypub)r (30)
k2 = h2(e(Ypub, Yv)r) (31)
c = Ek2(m) (32)
a = h3(c, k1) (33)
S = rYpub − aσ (34)
Up sends the signcrypted message δ = (c, a, S,N) to Uv.
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5.5 Signature recovery and veriﬁcation
Upon receiving the signcrypted message δ = (c, a, S,N) from Up, Uv ﬁrst
recovers k1 by computing
k1 = e(B,S)e(Ypub, Yo + N)a (35)
since
e(B,S)e(Ypub, Yo + N)a
=e(B, rYpub − aσ)e(sB, a(Yo + N)) - by Eq. (34), (24), (2)
=e(B, rYpub − a(Xo + dYpub))e(sB, a(Yo + N)) - by Eq. (28)
=e(B, rsB − a(sYo + dsB))e(sB, a(Yo + N)) - by Eq. (24), (26)
=e(sB, rB − a(Yo + N))e(sB, a(Yo + N)) - by Eq. (2)
=e(sB, rB) - by Eq. (3)
=e(Ypub, B)r - by Eq. (24), (2)
=e(B, Ypub)r - by Eq. (1)
=k1 - by Eq. (30)
Uv then recovers k2 by computing
k2 = h2(e(S, Yv)e(Yo + N,Xv)a) (36)
since
h2(e(S, Yv)e(Yo + N,Xv)a)
=h2(e(rYpub − aσ, Yv)e(Yo + N, sYv)a) - by Eq. (34), (26)
=h2(e(rYpub − aσ, Yv)e(as(Yo + N), Yv)) - by Eq. (2)
=h2(e(rYpub − aσ, Yv)e(a(Xo + dsB), Yv)) - by Eq. (26), (27)
=h2(e(rYpub − aσ, Yv)e(a(Xo + dYpub), Yv)) - by Eq. (24)
=h2(e(rYpub − aσ, Yv)e(aσ, Yv)) - by Eq. (28)
=h2(e(rYpub, Yv)) - by Eq. (3)
=h2(e(Ypub, Yv)r) - by Eq. (2)
=k2 - by Eq. (31)
Finally, Uv is able to recover the message m = Dk2(c) and accepts the sign-
crypted message δ if and only if the following SRV test holds
a
?= h3(c, k1) (37)
5.6 The PCF attack to the EA scheme
Unlike the LWHY scheme, the EA scheme does not have a proxy warrant.
Thus, the motivation of Up to forge the proxy credential will not be extending
his proxy signing power. However, a malicious Up can forge a credential and
secretly give it to another person Up′ without the agreement of the original
signer Uo. With the forged credential, Up′ can proxy signcrypted a message to
Uv on behalf of Uo, though he does not have a proper delegation from Uo.
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5.6.1 Up generates a fake proxy credential
The Malicious Up can use his proxy credential C = (σ,N) to generate a fake
proxy credential C ′ = (σ′, N ′). Up ﬁrst picks a random number d′ ∈ Zq and
then computes
N ′ = N + d′B = dB + d′B = (d + d′)B = d′′B (38)
where d′′ = d + d′. Up then computes the corresponding σ′ by
σ′ = σ + d′Ypub = Xo + dYpub + d′Ypub = Xo + d′′Ypub (39)
Up can unlawfully give the fake proxy credential C ′ to a third person Up′ .
Based on the fake C ′, Up′ can randomly pick a number r′ ∈ Z∗q and signcrypt
a message δ′ = (c′, a′, S′, N ′) to Uv by computing Eq. (30) to Eq. (34), that
is,
k′1 = e(B, Ypub)
r′ (40)
k′2 = h2(e(Ypub, Yv)
r′) (41)
c′ = Ek′2(m) (42)
a′ = h3(c′.k′1) (43)
S′ = r′Ypub − a′σ′ (44)
5.6.2 Pass signature recovery and veriﬁcation
Upon receiving the fake signcrypted message (c′, a′, S′, N ′), Uv performs the
signature recovery and veriﬁcation process as described in Section 5.5. He
recovers both k1 and k2 using Eq. (35) and Eq. (36) but with inputs from the
fake δ′. The recovery will be successful since
k1 = e(B,S′)e(Ypub, Yo + N ′)a
′
- by Eq. (35)
= e(B, r′Ypub − a′σ′)e(sB, Yo + N ′)a′ - by Eq. (44), (24)
= e(B, r′Ypub − a′σ′)e(sB, a′(Yo + N ′)) - by Eq. (2)
= e(B, r′Ypub − a′(Xo + d′′Ypub))e(sB, a′(Yo + N ′)) - by Eq. (39)
= e(B, r′sB − a′(sYo + d′′sB))e(sB, a′(Yo + N ′)) - by Eq. (24), (26)
= e(sB, r′B − a′(Yo + N ′))e(sB, a′(Yo + N ′)) - by Eq. (2)
= e(sB, r′B) - by Eq. (3)
= e(Ypub, r′B) - by Eq. (24)
= e(Ypub, B)r
′
- by Eq. (2)
= e(B, Ypub)r
′
- by Eq. (1)
= k′1 - by Eq. (40)
and
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k2 = h2(e(S′, Yv)e(Yo + N ′, Xv)a
′
) - by Eq. (36)
= h2(e(r′Ypub − a′σ′, Yv)e(Yo + N ′, sYv)a′) - by Eq. (44), (26)
= h2(e(r′Ypub − a′σ′, Yv)e(Yo + N ′, Yv)sa′) - by Eq. (2)
= h2(e(r′Ypub − a′σ′, Yv)e(a′s(Yo + N ′), Yv)) - by Eq. (2)
= h2(e(r′Ypub − a′σ′, Yv)e(a′(Xo + sd′′B), Yv)) - by Eq. (26), (38)
= h2(e(r′Ypub − a′σ′, Yv)e(a′(Xo + d′′Ypub), Yv)) - by Eq. (24)
= h2(e(r′Ypub − a′σ′, Yv)e(a′σ′, Yv)) - by Eq. (39)
= h2(e(r′Ypub, Yv)) - by Eq. (3)
= h2(e(Ypub, Yv)r
′
) - by Eq. (2)
= k′2 - by Eq. (41)
After computing both k′1 and k
′
2, Uv recovers the message m = Dk′2(c
′) and
performs the SRV test using Eq. (37). The fake signcrypted message δ′ =
(c′, a′, S′, N ′) and the recovered k′1 can pass the checking a
′ ?= h3(c′, k′1) since,
by Eq. (43), that is how a′ was ﬁrst generated by Up′ .
5.6.3 Failure of resolving repudiation
Uo later discovers that the proxy signcrypted message generated by Up′ does
not have his proxy delegation. He will ask a trusted judge to decide who is
dishonest. The judge ﬁrst asks Uv to present the signcrypted message δ′ =
(c′, a′, S′, N ′) and check the validity of the message. It will pass the SRV test
as described in the previous section and the judge concludes that Uv is honestly
presenting a valid proxy signcrypted message.
Next, the judge needs to decide either Uo or Up′ is dishonest. He asks Up′
to present the proxy credential he received from Uo. The forged credential
C ′ = (σ′, N ′) presented by Up′ will pass the PCV test in Eq. (29) and the
judge will falsely believe that Up′ is innocent since
e(B, σ′) = e(B,Xo + d′′Ypub) - by Eq. (39)
= e(B, sYo + d′′sB) - by Eq. (26), (24)
= e(sB, Yo + d′′B) - by Eq. (2)
= e(Ypub, Yo + N ′) - by Eq. (24), (38)
6 Prevention of PCF attacks
This paper gave two examples of the PCF attack to the LWHY and the EA
schemes. The same attack can be applied to other proxy signature/signcryption
schemes if they do not satisfy the proxy credential unforgeability (PCNF) prop-
erty described in Section 2.2. Actually, we have found another proxy signature
scheme [23] which is also insecure against the proposed PCF attack, where a
malicious signature veriﬁer can generate a fake signature on a diﬀerent mes-
sage m′ from a signature of m. To save the page size, we do not include the
discussion of this scheme in the paper.
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This section discusses how to modify both the LWHY and the EA schemes
to prevent the attack. In most of the proxy signature/signcryption schemes,
the original signer Uo creates a proxy credential with some embedded secrets
such as a random number and the Uo’s private key. The proxy signer Up can
then use Uo’s public key to verify that the credential is indeed constructed
from Uo’s private key without revealing the embedded secrets.
In both the LWHY and the EA schemes, there are two major components
N and σ in the proxy credential. These two components need to match each
other, i.e., only a matched pair can pass the PCV test. However, the matching
relationship between N and σ is easy to re-produce in the LWHY and the EA
schemes. The PCF attack presented in this paper re-produces the matching
relationship to a fake pair N ′ and σ′ from the original pair N and σ. This is
why both schemes are vulnerable to the PCF attacks.
Thus, the prevention of the PCF attacks must focus on making it diﬃcult
to re-produce the matching relationship of N and σ. From Eq. (5) and (6)
in the LWHY scheme and Eq. (27) and (28) in the EA scheme, we can see
that both N and σ are constructed using the same random secret d and that
is the only matching requirement. If we are able to add an extra matching
requirement between N and σ, the proposed PCF attack can be prevented.
Our approach is to add the component N into the construction of the other
component σ. The detail of the modiﬁcation to the LWHY and the EA schemes
are described in the following two sections.
6.1 Modiﬁcation to the LWHY scheme
A simple and practical modiﬁcation to the LWHY scheme is to change the
credential (σ,N,mw) generation to
N = dB (45)
σ = [N ]xxo + dmw mod q (46)
where d ∈ Zq is a randomly picked one-time secret number and [N ]x is the
x-coordinate of the point N ∈ G1. In addition, the PCV test in Eq. (7) should
be changed to
σB
?= [N ]xYo + mwN (47)
For message signcryption and signature recovery and veriﬁcation, no change
is required since the proposed attack only targets at the proxy credential gen-
eration.
Now, let’s show how the proxy credential veriﬁcation works in the modiﬁed
LWHY scheme. Upon receiving a proxy credential (σ,N,mw) from Uo, the
proxy signer Up veriﬁes the credential using the PCV test in Eq. (47). If the
test returns true, the credential is valid since
σB = ([N ]xxo + dmw)B - by Eq. (46)
= [N ]xYo + mwN - by Eq. (4), (5)
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6.1.1 Secure against the PCF attack
Proposition 1 below shows that the modiﬁed LWHY scheme is secure against
the PCF attack proposed in Section 4.6.
Proposition 1. The PCF attack proposed in Section 4.6 will not be successful
in the modiﬁed LWHY scheme.
Proof: Applying the same PCF attack to the modiﬁed scheme, the malicious
proxy signer Up generates a fake proxy warrant m′w to extend his signing
power. Based on his/her original credential (σ,N,mw), he computes
σ′ =
m′w
mw
σ =
m′w
mw
[N ]xxo + dm′w mod q (48)
N ′ =
m′w
mw
Yo + m′wN − Yo
m′w
(49)
The fake credential (σ′, N ′,m′w), which passes the PCV test in the original
LWHY scheme, will not pass the PCV test, deﬁned in Eq. (47), in the modiﬁed
LWHY scheme since
σ′B = (m
′
w
mw
[N ]xxo + dm′w)B - by Eq. (48)
= m
′
w
mw
[N ]xYo + m′wN - by Eq. (4), (5)
= [N ′]xYo +
m′w
mw
[N ]xYo + m′wN − [N ′]xYo
= [N ′]xYo + m′w(
m′w
mw
[N ]xYo+m
′
wN−[N ′]xYo
m′w
)
= [N ′]xYo + m′wN ′ - by Eq. (49) 
The modiﬁed scheme only changes the proxy credential generation and its
veriﬁcation in the LWHY scheme. The message signcryption, recovery and ver-
iﬁcation procedures are not modiﬁed. Thus, the security proofs of their scheme
in [16] against IND-CCA2 (conﬁdentiality against indistinguishability under
adaptive chosen-ciphertext attacks) and EF-CMA (unforgeability against exis-
tential forgery under adaptive chosen-message attacks) can be directly applied
to the modiﬁed scheme.
6.1.2 Added computational complexity
For the computational complexity, the modiﬁed LWHY scheme only adds a few
operations to the credential generation and to the credential veriﬁcation, where
these two processes are required only at the time a new proxy delegation from
Uo to Up occurs. Comparing to the bilinear pairing operations in the more fre-
quent signcryption generation, recovery and veriﬁcation processes, the added
operations are not signiﬁcant. Comparing Eq. (46) to Eq. (6), the original
signer Uo in the modiﬁed LWHY scheme requires to compute an extra modu-
lar multiplication [N ]xxo mod q. Similarly, comparing Eq. (47) to Eq. (7), one
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Table 1 Number of required operations for the LWHY scheme and the modiﬁed LWHY
scheme, where PCG, PCV, SMG and SRV represents the proxy credential generation, proxy
credential veriﬁcation, signcrypted message generation and signature recovery & veriﬁcation.
Schemes PCG PCV SMG SRV
# of Mm LWHY 1 1
Modiﬁed 2 1
# of Pm LWHY 1 2 4 5
Modiﬁed 1 3 4 5
# of Pa LWHY 1 4
Modiﬁed 1 4
# of I LWHY 1
Modiﬁed 1
# of H LWHY 3 3
Modiﬁed 3 3
# of E/D LWHY 1 1
Modiﬁed 1 1
# of Bp LWHY 1 3
Modiﬁed 1 3
additional point multiplication [N ]xYo in G1 is required for the proxy signer Up
in the modiﬁed LWHY scheme. Table 1 gives the required operations in both
LWHY and the modiﬁed LWHY scheme, where Mm, H, Pm, Pa, I, E/D and
Bp represent the modular multiplication in Zq, hashing, point multiplication
in G1, point addition in G1, inversion in Zq, symmetric encryption/decryption
and bilinear pairing operations, respectively. We ignore operations such as the
modular addition in Zq and bit-wise exclusive-or since their computational
time is insigniﬁcant comparing to other operations. There are three kinds of
hash functions used h1, h2 and h3 in the LWHY scheme. They are comparable
to each other in terms of eﬃciency. Thus, for simplicity, we just count the
number of hash operations without further diﬀerentiating them in Table 1.
A blank entry in Table 1 means that no corresponding operation required
in both schemes. The entries with bold numbers indicate that the modiﬁed
LWHY scheme needs more operations than the LWHY scheme does. If the
practical elliptic curve E/F3163 is used to implement the group G1, according
to the best result in [24], one bilinear pairing (Bp) operation is about 11, 110
modular multiplications (Mm) in F3163, while a point multiplication (Pm)
of E/F3163 is just a few hundred modular multiplications in F3163. Thus,
comparing to the required Bp operations in both schemes, the added one Mm
and one Pm operations in the modiﬁed LWHY scheme is insigniﬁcant.
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6.2 Modiﬁcation to the EA scheme
To prevent the PCF attack, we also propose a modiﬁed EA scheme using
the same approach used in the modiﬁed LWHY scheme. The proxy credential
(σ,N) generation of the EA scheme in Eq. (27) and (28) will be modiﬁed to
N = dB (50)
σ = [N ]xXo + dYpub (51)
The corresponding PCV test in Eq. (29) also needs to change to
e(B, σ) ?= e(Ypub, [N ]xYo + N) (52)
The modiﬁed EA scheme does not require to change the signcrypted mes-
sage generation procedure from the EA scheme. That is, the modiﬁed EA
scheme still uses Eq. (30) to Eq. (34) to generate a signcrypted message.
However, the signature recovery and veriﬁcation procedures of the original
EA scheme do need to be modiﬁed. In the modiﬁed EA scheme, after receiving
a signcrypted message (c, a, S,N) from Up, the signature veriﬁer Uv recovers
k1 and k2 using Eq. (53) and Eq. (54), respectively.
k1 = e(B,S)e(Ypub, [N ]xYo + N)a (53)
k2 = h2(e(S, Yv)e([N ]xYo + N,Xv)a) (54)
since
e(B,S)e(Ypub, [N ]xYo + N)a
=e(B,S)e(sB, a([N ]xYo + N)) - by Eq. (24), (2)
=e(B, rYpub − aσ)e(sB, a([N ]xYo + N)) - by Eq. (34)
=e(B, rsB − a([N ]xsYo + dsB))e(sB, a([N ]xYo + N)) - by Eq. (24), (51)
=e(sB, rB − a([N ]xYo + dB))e(sB, a([N ]xYo + N)) - by Eq. (2)
=e(sB, rB − a([N ]xYo + N))e(sB, a([N ]xYo + N)) - by Eq. (50)
=e(sB, rB) - by Eq. (3)
=e(Ypub, B)r - by Eq. (24), (2)
=e(B, Ypub)r - by Eq. (1)
=k1 - by Eq. (30)
and
h2(e(S, Yv)e([N ]xYo + N,Xv)a)
=h2(e(rYpub − aσ, Yv)e([N ]xYo + N, sYv)a) - by Eq. (34), (26)
=h2(e(rYpub − aσ, Yv)e([N ]xYo + N,Yv)as) - by Eq. (2)
=h2(e(rYpub − aσ, Yv)e(as([N ]xYo + N), Yv)) - by Eq. (2)
=h2(e(rYpub − aσ, Yv)e(a([N ]xXo + dsB), Yv)) - by Eq. (26), (50)
=h2(e(rYpub − aσ, Yv)e(a([N ]xXo + dYpub), Yv)) - by Eq. (24)
=h2(e(rYpub − aσ, Yv)e(aσ, Yv)) - by Eq. (51)
=h2(e(rYpub, Yv)) - by Eq. (3)
=h2(e(Ypub, Yv)r) - by Eq. (2)
=k2 - by Eq. (31)
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Eq. (53) and Eq. (54) in the modiﬁed EA scheme are the replacements
of Eq. (35) and Eq. (36) in the EA scheme. To recover the message m and
verify the signcrypted message, the modiﬁed EA scheme performs the exact
same procedures as the EA scheme. That is, m = Dk2(c) and accepts the
signcrypted message if the SRV test a ?= h3(c, k1) returns true.
6.2.1 Secure against the PCF attack
The modiﬁed EA scheme is secure against the PCF attack proposed in Section
5.6. In the PCF attack to the original EA scheme, the malicious Up creates
a fake credential (σ′, N ′) from the original credential (σ,N) and then give it
to another person Up′ who has no proper delegation from Uo. Proposition 2
shows this attack will not be successful in the modiﬁed EA scheme.
Proposition 2. The PCF attack proposed in Section 5.6 will not be successful
in the modiﬁed EA scheme.
Proof: Applying the same attack to the modiﬁed EA scheme, the malicious
Up picks a random number d′ ∈ Zq and then computes
N ′ = N + d′B = dB + d′B = (d + d′)B = d′′B (55)
σ′ = σ + d′Ypub = [N ]xXo + dYpub + d′Ypub = [N ]xXo + d′′Ypub (56)
where d′′ = d+d′. However, this pair of (σ′, N ′) in the fake credential will not
be matched to pass the PCV test in the modiﬁed EA scheme as deﬁned in Eq.
(52) since
e(B, σ′) = e(B, [N ]xXo + d′′Ypub) - by Eq. (56)
= e(B, [N ]xsYo + d′′sB) - by Eq. (26), (24)
= e(sB, [N ]xYo + d′′B) - by Eq. (2)
= e(Ypub, [N ]xYo + N ′) - by Eq. (24), (55)
= e(Ypub, [N ′]xYo + N ′) - by Eq. (52) ♦
6.2.2 Added computational complexity
The notations used in Section 6.1.2 will be used here again to describe the
added computational complexity. The modiﬁed EA scheme only changes the
computation of σ (Eq. (51) vs. Eq. (28)), the PCV test (Eq. (52) vs. Eq. (29)),
and the recovery of k1 and k2 (Eq. (53) vs. Eq. (30) and Eq. (54) vs. Eq. (31),
respectively). The modiﬁed EA scheme requires that each of Uo, Up and Uv
performs one extra Pm operation in the σ computation, in the PCV test, and
in the recovery of k1 and k2, respectively. Note that Uv can compute [N ]xYo
and remember it while recovering k1 and use it later for recovering k2. Assume
the elliptic curve E/F3163 is used to implement the group G1. The added three
Pm operations are insigniﬁcant, comparing to the required Bp operations in
both schemes since the computation complexity of one Bp operations is about
This is an author-produced, peer-reviewed version of this article. The final publication is available at
www.springerlink.com. Copyright restrictions may apply. DOI: 10.1007/s11227-014-1134-9
20 Jyh-haw Yeh
Table 2 Number of required operations for the EA scheme and the modiﬁed EA scheme,
where PCG, PCV, SMG and SRV represents the proxy credential generation, proxy creden-
tial veriﬁcation, signcrypted message generation and signature recovery & veriﬁcation.
Schemes PCG PCV SMG SRV
# of Pm EA 2 0 2 1
Modiﬁed 3 1 2 2
# of Pa EA 1 1 1 1
Modiﬁed 1 1 1 1
# of H EA 2 2
Modiﬁed 2 2
# of E/D EA 1 1
Modiﬁed 1 1
# of Bp EA 2 2 4
Modiﬁed 2 2 4
11,110 Mm operations in F3163, whereas one Pm operation in E/F3163 is only
about a few hundred Mm operations in F3163. To show the insigniﬁcance of the
added Pm operations, Table 2 gives all required operations in both schemes.
7 Conclusion
The non-repudiation of a proxy signature/signcryption of a message, from a
proxy signer to a signature veriﬁer, is usually the main focus in many schemes.
In this paper, we point out that the non-repudiation of a proxy credential, from
an original signer to a proxy signer, is important as well by presenting a proxy
credential forgery attack to two recent proxy signcryption schemes. The paper
also proposes possible modiﬁcations to the two schemes so that the improved
schemes are secure against the attack.
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